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In the first four years of new Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou’s leadership, some progress may be made in easing the cross-straits predicament, primarily concerning procedures such as the three links – postal, trade and transport services – and personnel visits. However, no breakthrough can be expected on the security issue.
At the heart of the problem is the two sides’ different understanding of the so-called “one-China consensus.” As long as China refuses to recognize the existence of the Republic of China as a political entity, the chronic crisis in cross-strait relations is unlikely to change. The “two-state theory” raised by former President Lee Teng-hui – that China and Taiwan have separate and equal status – might once again be raised and impact the stability of cross-strait relations.
In fact, the mainland policy of the ruling Kuomintang has been called a “Lee Teng-hui route without Lee Teng-hui.”
How will the Chinese government take on Ma Ying-jeou’s “no reunification, no independence, no arms race” policy? As a Chinese strategist stated in a televised debate with the author, China is very concerned about the KMT’s position of “stalling” and “maintaining the status quo” on the issue of reunification. Delaying tactics are not substantially different from Taiwan independence, he claimed.
China will not tolerate the long-term existence of “two Chinas.” Without a legitimate excuse for its military expansion – such as “preventing Taiwan’s independence” – China will shift its position to “containing an independent Taiwan.” In other words, China’s pace of military expansion will not slow down due to Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency in Taiwan.
Any doubt about this will surely be dispelled when China releases its new military budget figures during the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in March 2009.
As a precondition for signing any peace agreement with China, Ma Ying-jeou has demanded that China withdraw its missiles directed at Taiwan. Militarily, as a matter of fact, withdrawing the ground-to-ground short-range missiles currently deployed in Fujian, Jiangxi and Guangdong provinces would have little practical value in easing the military threat to Taiwan; it would take only 24 to72 hours to redeploy these missiles. Unless China destroys all its short-range ballistic missiles with a range less than 600 kilometers, Taiwan’s basic security will not be guaranteed.
Meanwhile, the worries of neighboring countries about China are on the rise. Therefore, the top priority of the new KMT government is to strengthen its strategic relations with the United States and Japan and rebuild strategic mutual trust. This kind of trust between Taiwan, the United States and Japan has been greatly jeopardized over the last eight years.
In rebuilding its defense capability, Taiwan should first of all implement the three major arms procurement policies that the KMT government proposed eight years ago.
The first priority should be the issue of importing Patriot III interceptors from the United States during the first four years of Ma Ying-jeou’s administration. At the same time, Taiwan should get to work on procuring the new F-16 block 52 fighters and eight submarines it has ordered from the United States.
If there is any room for bargaining, it would be best to replace the planned F-16s with F-15s. Looking at procurements of combat aircraft by Japan, South Korea and Singapore, one can see the trend toward twin-engine heavy fighters as the dominant aerial combat platform. In addition, the need for anti-armored vehicle landing measures should be taken into consideration, and plans made for either the indigenous production or procurement of equipment including combat helicopters.
Another priority area is accelerating the research and development of indigenous advanced weapon systems and reinforcing effective deterrence measures. This could include the production of more cruise missiles, long-range air-to-ground precision strike weapons and ship-to-ship and ship-to-ground precision attack capabilities.
Taiwan should also invest in the research and development of ground-to-ground missiles with the maximum strike range allowed by international treaties, to be used as a political card when negotiating with the United States on arms procurement. Moreover, Taiwan must manufacture more multi-role offshore patrol vehicles and advanced stealth-missile swift boats.
At the same time, Taiwan needs to upgrade the fighters currently in service in its air force, especially its IDF and F-16 fleets. These fighters should be capable of engaging in multiple combat missions or becoming multi-role fighters.
As for the surface warships it has currently in service, Taiwan should follow the practice of Japan and employ Link 16 communications systems to integrate their combat capabilities with the ability to engage in information and electronic warfare. In particular, both the La Fayette and Perry class frigates have been in service in the Taiwanese navy for more than 10 years and are approaching the time for drastic upgrading.
Taiwan should also increase investment in its intelligence agencies. The budgets of the National Security Agency and the Military Intelligence Agency must be greatly increased if Taiwan wants to gain the upper hand in human intelligence in the Taiwan Strait.
Taiwan’s annual military spending of 3 percent of GDP seems to be insufficient to achieve the goal of rejuvenating the military on all fronts and ensuring its national defense. To that end, an increased military budget is necessary.
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(Andrei Chang is editor-in-chief of Kanwa Defense Review Monthly, registered in Toronto, Canada.)
