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There were doubts about the possibility of the government winning the elections. About 80 percent of the eastern population is equally divided between the Tamil and Muslim communities. As the present government is closely associated with the forces of Sinhalese nationalism, there seemed to be a strong possibility of the Tamil and Muslim vote going in large measure to the opposition. A defeat for the government would have indicated that the ethnic minorities disapproved of the government’s strategy and actions in the war-torn North and East.
However, the results of the election have shown otherwise. A majority of the Tamil and Muslim voters supported the government. The implications of this are significant. It would legitimize the government’s argument that the Tamil and Muslim population in the east is prepared to support, or at least acquiesce, in its strategy of military elimination of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, to be followed by reconstruction and a restoration of the electoral process.
Critics of the government, including election monitoring groups, have argued that the opposition parties were disadvantaged from the outset of the election campaign, and that conditions of free and fair elections did not prevail during the entire course of the election campaign and poll. The period of the election campaign was marked by undercurrents of intimidation, although there was low overt violence during the campaign itself. As a result, campaigning was carried out under a security environment not conducive to a free and fair election.
One of the most controversial features of the elections was that the TMVP, which is a former militant group, continued to retain its arms on the grounds of self defense. The basic requirement for free and fair elections was not met. One of the contesting parties was armed and in a position to intimidate both their political rivals as well as voters and election officials.
Adding to this problem was the fact that the TMVP was contesting in alliance with the government, which put the system of checks and balances on electoral malpractice into jeopardy. There were numerous complaints from contesting parties of police and administrative inaction in the face of their complaints that a significant level of intimidation had obstructed their electoral campaigns. There were allegations that the TMVP had been intimidating its political rivals. The very low level of campaigning by rival parties in some parts of the east was independently verified by election monitors and the media.
On the other hand, it appears that the government’s success is based on a winning formula that incorporates at least three factors, these being patronage, strong-arm tactics and the LTTE. The legitimacy of the strong-arm tactics used by the government is intertwined with the presence of the LTTE and its seemingly unending appetite to engage in violence.
The TMVP has retained its arms on the basis that they will be killed off by the LTTE if they are disarmed. But as a result of being an armed group, the TMVP was able to intimidate and threaten the electorate at the elections. As the TMVP was the electoral partner of the government, the security forces found themselves disempowered in fulfilling their legitimate duties by the people. The vast majority of complaints on Election Day were against the TMVP.
The government’s willingness to use patronage was another factor that was obvious at these elections. Virtually the entire Cabinet, along with deputy ministers numbering over 100, was reported to be present campaigning on the ground.
Another feature of these elections that detracted from the standard of free and fair elections was the misuse of state property to take forward the government’s election campaign. State vehicles and buildings, including schools and rest houses belonging to various government departments, were blatantly utilized for the election campaign. The ministers swarmed around like busy bees inaugurating dozens of economic development projects during the election period.
The government’s campaign strategy may be costing the country dearly in terms of economic logic and political morality. But it shows results that matter most to politicians, which is the vote of the electorate. It also appears from public opinion polls that the majority of people are prepared to go on bearing the terrible cost of the war for the sake of defeating the LTTE once and for all, as promised by the government.
It is ironic that the LTTE should provide the justification to the government’s prioritization of a military solution at any cost. Until the LTTE is influenced to change course, the dynamic of war, propaganda and sacrifice is likely to continue into the foreseeable future.
Those who believe that the government’s high-cost strategy is not viable in the longer term nevertheless face an uphill task at the present time. Their stance that conflict resolution requires respect for human rights and a political solution offered in negotiations to the LTTE is not being supported by the outcome of the electoral process.
This situation will be especially discouraging to the opposition political parties that have been dealt yet another defeat. They will need to rethink their strategy to capture political power. In the meantime the government will be planning to replicate its eastern success in the north. But peace remains a long way off.
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(Dr. Jehan Perera is executive director of the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, an independent advocacy organization. He studied economics at Harvard College and holds a doctorate in law from Harvard Law School. ©Copyright Jehan Perera.)
